Office to residential – some interesting examples

01.48 in –, bin, Boat Plans, crusade, eric’s, examples, interesting, office, residential, some, to, uncle, wheelie

NOTE: There have been significant changes to the law since this blog post was published, and so the material printed below (including the appended comments) does not accurately reflect the current position. For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - ”A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

There are interesting and encouraging signs that some LPAs are taking a positive and proactive approach to the new permitted development right allowing the conversion of offices to residential use. Furthermore, despite the doubts I expressed initially, it seems that there are no qualms about multiple conversions, involving the creation of a significant number of new flats within a single large office building.

I understand that Birmingham City Council has recently approved a 120-unit conversion in an office building in the city under the prior approval procedure introduced in May, rather than by means of an application for full planning permission. Other large schemes are in the pipeline around the country, but a few authorities are showing a degree of reluctance to accept such conversions, even for single units. As I have observed before, we shall have to await the outcome of a number of appeals before it becomes clear how the issues that arise from the drafting of the legislation are likely to be resolved.

It seems that the LPAs that are responding positively to these prior approval applications are fully prepared to accept that there is no opportunity to seek any element of affordable housing in such schemes and that the scope for securing other benefits from developers is limited. If there are any LPAs that don’t accept this, they may find out the hard way, through the appeals process, what the true limits of their powers are under the new prior approval procedure.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Whitley revisited the result

08.09 in Boat Plans, by, condition, further, restricted, result, revisited, some, the, thoughts, uses, whitley

In a post on Tuesday, 17 December 2013, I drew attention to an application for judicial review in the High Court ( R (Ellaway) v. Cardiff CC ) which had the potential, if it had succeeded, to bring about a significant change in the accepted position regarding pre-commencement conditions, otherwise known as ‘conditions precedent’.

I had hoped to be alerted when judgment was handed down, but in the event this judgment escaped my attention when it was given on 27 March 2014 ( [2014] EWHC 836 (Admin) ). As I had rather expected, the claim was dismissed.

It was not disputed that by the time development commenced on site, the developer had applied for the discharge of all the pre-commencement conditions, although the Council had not yet determined those applications. There was some argument as to the procedural propriety of the means by which the Council dealt with the applications for discharge of the conditions, but the work undertaken on site was carried out in strict conformity with the details provided by the developer in support of the applications for discharge of the conditions. This was exactly in accordance with what has long been accepted as an ‘exception’ to the general rule in Whitley, and this exception is derived from the Whitley judgement itself. There was clearly no basis on which the Council’s action could be challenged on this ground.

The claimant had sought to argue that a matter of this kind ought not to be dealt with in that way, but should be the subject of an application for retrospective planning permission under section 73A. However, Wyn Williams J did not consider that there is any basis to conclude that the Whitley principle and the exceptions to that principle cannot co-exist with Section 73A of the 1990 Act. There is no authority which begins to suggest the contrary. Further, there can be no doubt now, if there ever was following the judgment in Whitley, that the Whitley principle itself is regarded as “a clear legal principle of general application” – see Greyfort Properties Limited v SSCLG [2011] EWCA Civ 908. It is equally clear that the acknowledged exceptions to the principle are also founded upon clear principles of general application.

The possible difference of approach required in this case, as argued by the claimant, arose from the fact that this was EIA development, and (so it was argued) the need to comply with European directives required a more rigorous procedure to be adopted. Nonetheless, it was accepted on behalf of the claimant that European law does not prohibit the grant of retrospective planning permission – i.e. the grant of planning permission after the proposed development has been initiated prior to the discharge of pre-commencement conditions. (See the decision of the Court of Appeal in R (Ardagh Glass Ltd) v Cheshire West Council [2010] EWCA Civ 172.) However, the claimant submitted that European law demands that such a grant should be made only exceptionally and, in effect, only in the context of an application made under Section 73A of the 1990 Act.

Both the Council and the developer strongly disputed that a grant of retrospective planning permission must be made only in the context of section 73A of the 1990 Act. Furthermore, they both submitted that neither the Council nor the developer had acted inconsistently with the relevant principles of European law.

To put it shortly, Wyn Williams J found that the Whitley principle is entirely consistent with the aims and objects of the Directive. The rationale of the exception is to avoid unnecessary formality and wasted time and expenditure. The terms of the exception are clear and self-contained. It is obvious when the exception will apply. The fact that this exception is the product of judicial decision-making, as opposed to Parliamentary enactment, does not mean that it is unpredictable, unclear, imprecise or uncertain. In truth both the Whitley principle itself and the exception relied upon by the Council are clear and their application in individual cases is entirely predictable. The fact that the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that the exceptions to the Whitley principle may not be closed does not mean that the acknowledged exceptions are unpredictable or uncertain.

In the circumstances, the court did not consider it necessary to deal with the issue of delay, which might very well have prevented the grant of relief in this case if the claimant had made out the legal grounds to support her claim.

So we can all breathe a sigh of relief, and continue to rely on the Whitley principle and its acknowledged exceptions. The added ‘European’ dimension made no difference in this case, and there would seem to be no basis for arguing that the discharge of conditions should be dealt with differently in such a case compared with normal procedure. The time for an EIA assessment (where this is required) is much earlier, at the planning application stage. It has been established that the approval of reserved matters after a grant of outline permission can also give rise to a requirement for a separate EIA at that stage, but it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which an application for the discharge of pre-commencement conditions (‘conditions precedent’) could give rise to such a requirement, even where the discharge of those conditions is retrospective following the commencement of development.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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The 56 day rule – some additional points

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NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

A couple of readers have written to me to draw attention to Article 7 of the GPDO. This is a new provision that did not appear in the 1995 Order.

There was no provision in the 1995 Order for any extension of time in respect of the determination of a prior approval application. However, Article 7 (after restating the basic rule that prior approval applications must be determined within 56 days) now allows the LPA to make a decision in relation to the application within such longer period as may be agreed by the applicant and the authority in writing (which could comprise an exchange of emails).

There is, of course, no obligation on the applicant to agree to such an extension of time, but if they do not do so a prudent authority might then refuse the application fairly promptly in order to avoid the 56-day rule coming into operation, thereby enabling the development to go ahead in any event. It is clear that any agreement to an extension of time would have to be explicit and unequivocal; it cannot be assumed or implied, nor can it be construed from only one side of a purported exchange of correspondence. A nil response from the applicant to the LPA’s a request for more time would not prevent time from continuing to run for the purposes of the 56-day rule. There would need to be some written evidence that both parties had agreed to extend time.

One correspondent queried whether sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in Article 7 do in fact enable time to be extended (or whether sub-paragraph (a) in fact rules this out), but there is no doubt that any one of sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) or (c) may apply; there is a comma after sub-paragraph (a), so it is clear that each is an alternative to the others.

Reverting to appeals against non-determination of a prior approval application, after further representations from the LPA, the Planning Inspectorate subsequently changed their minds in the case I mentioned in my last post, and accepted the appeal, on the basis that the case raised other issues besides the question of non-determination within the 56-day period. In the absence of such additional issues, though, it would appear that it is unnecessary (and in fact impossible) to appeal against the non-determination of a prior approval application. The right to proceed with the development arises automatically. However, if there is any doubt in such a case as to the qualification of the pre-existing use under the terms of the relevant Class of permitted development in Part 3, or as to the nature and scope of the proposed development itself, it may in such circumstances be advisable to make an application for a Lawful Development Certificate under section 192 of the 1990 Act, as I mentioned previously.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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Uses restricted by condition some further thoughts

13.40 in adverts, banner, Boat Plans, buildings, by, condition, further, more, on, restricted, shrouded, some, thoughts, uses

In two previous blog posts (“Can conditions preclude Permitted Development?” on Friday, 18 October 2013, and “Conditions that fail to prevent Permitted Development” on Monday, 24 March 2014) I discussed the circumstances in which a condition attached to a planning permission may preclude the operation of section 55(2)(f) of the 1990 Act and Article 3(1) of the Use Classes Order and/or Article 3(1) and Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the General Permitted Development Order – in other words, the right to use the land or building in question for other purposes within the same Use Class and/or to make any of the changes of use that are (or would otherwise be) Permitted Development.

Since then, I have been considering some other judicial decisions on this issue that may shed further light on the topic, although I am bound to say that these judgments have left the position far from clear.

First of all, as I have previously pointed out, a condition that expressly refers to either the UCO or the GPDO can certainly prevent the operation of those Orders. It is perhaps worth noting in this connection that the model conditions that were previously recommended (in Circular 11/95) read:

"The premises shall be used for......…and for no other purpose (including any purpose in Class........… of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order with or without modification."

and

“Notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any order revoking and re-enacting that Order with or without modification) no....[specified development]........shall be [carried out].”

A problem only arises where those words, or very similar words have not been used.

In my first article, I argued that a condition which simply prohibited other uses without referring to either or both of these two pieces of subordinate legislation could not be taken to preclude their operation. My view (particularly with regard to the GPDO) was based on the proposition that a condition could not prevent an application for and grant of a fresh planning permission for a change of use to any of the uses that the original condition sought to prevent. If granted, the planning permission would supersede the previous permission (and its conditions) and this is exactly what Part 3 of the Second Schedule to the GPDO does; i.e. it grants planning permission (subject to certain requirements being met) for a further change of use. It was on this basis that I argued that a condition that does not expressly preclude the operation of the GPDO cannot therefore have the effect of preventing this permitted development.

Judicial support for this proposition, and for a similar approach to the operation of section 55(2)(f) and Article 3(1) of the Use Classes Order, can be found in the High Court judgment in Carpet Decor (Guildford) Ltd v. SSE [1981] JPL 806 and in the subsequent decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunoon Developments Ltd -v- SSE [1992] JPL 936, as discussed in the second of my two previous articles.

However, I am aware of two or three other judgments that have gone the other way, and the purpose of this third article is to examine these, and to attempt to form a view as to their effect on this issue.

The first of these was City of London Corporation v. SSE (1971) 23 P&CR 169 (which predated both Carpet Decor and Dunoon Developments). In that case, the wording of the condition was that "the premises shall be used as an employment agency and for no other purpose." This was held to operate effectively to exclude the operation of the Use Classes Order.

In Rugby Football Union v SSETR [2001] EWHC 927, the court considered a condition relating to stands at Twickenham Rugby Football Ground, which was worded that the stands "shall only be used ancillary to the main use of the premises as a sports stadium and for no other use." The argument that the words did not exclude the Use Classes Order was rejected by the court on the ground that the words for no other use were clear. They had no sensibly discernible purpose than to prevent some other use which might otherwise be permissible without planning permission, for example under the Use Classes Order (by virtue of section 55(2)(f)). The judge was satisfied that those words met the test of being sufficiently clear for the exclusion of the Use Classes Order.

A more recent decision - R (Royal London Mutual Insurance Society Limited) v. SSCLG [2013] EWHC 3597 (Admin) - related to planning permission for the construction of a non-food retail park comprising 5 units. This permission contained a condition which provided that: "The retail consent shall be for non food sales only in bulky trades normally found on retail parks which are furniture, carpets, DIY, electrical goods, car accessories, garden items and such other trades as the council may permit in writing." The stated reason for the condition was to ensure that the nature of the scheme would not detract from the vitality and viability of the nearby town centre.

The appellant sought a Lawful Development Certificate to confirm that they were entitled to use these retail units for any purpose within Use Class A1 of the UCO (i.e. not limited to the categories specified in the condition). On appeal against the council’s refusal of a certificate, the Inspector found that, on a fair interpretation, the use of the word only was effectively the same as the phrase and for no other purpose, especially when the condition was read in its entirety. When read alongside the reason and in the context of the permission as a whole, the Inspector found that the condition prevented the exercise of rights under the Use Classes Order (i.e. to use the premises for other purposes falling within Use Class A1).

When the matter came before the High Court, it was held that the reason for imposing a condition is important in understanding the objective of the condition. It is publicly available as part of the planning permission. To ignore it or to fail to have regard to the reason would operate as an unnatural and unnecessary constraint on an interpretation of the condition. This condition was intended to provide an on going mechanism to maintain the retail health of the town centre. In the Court’s judgment, that is what a reasonable reader of the condition would discern - namely, a non food retail consent only, with sales permitted of bulky goods within certain main sectors so as not to cause any material harm to the retail health of the town centre.

The Court specifically considered whether the wording of the condition might be insufficiently clear and unequivocal in its terms as to exclude the operation of the Use Classes Order. However, the judge regarded the use of the word "only" as emphatic. It meant solely or exclusively. That was its plain and ordinary meaning. This would prevent any retail sales other than those stipulated of a non food nature.

The Court did not agree that the absence of the words for no other use (in contrast with the Rugby Union case) made any difference in this regard. The condition before the court in the Royal London Insurance case could also be distinguished from Dunoon Developments, where there was nothing more than a restrictive description of the use in the relevant condition that might potentially (but did not in practice) exclude the Use Classes Order.

In Royal London Insurance there was a planning permission which, read as a whole, including Condition (3), set out what was permitted. Condition (3) restricted the ambit of Class A1 uses. It would be logically inconsistent to construe Condition (3) as carefully limiting A1 uses on the one hand, but then to argue that A1 use is unrestricted and permitted on the other. The condition only made sense if there was an implied exclusion of the Use Classes Order and Class A1 rights. In the Court’s judgment, this was achieved by the words used in the condition.

The first comment I would make in light of these judgments is that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Dunoon Developments should not be lightly set aside. I drew attention in my second article, on 24 March, to the clear words of both Farquharson LJ and the Vice-Chancellor, Sir David Nicholls. These words must be taken as an authoritative statement of the legal position in this regard. It follows that the other cases to which I have referred must, to a greater or lesser extent, have been dependent on their facts.

If any further refinement of the general proposition can be derived from these other cases it is perhaps that if, read as a whole and in context, the clear words of the condition (including the stated reasons for its imposition) leave no doubt that the planning permission that is being granted is only for a strictly limited use, then it may be effective to preclude the operation of either or both of the UCO and the GPDO, even though these are not expressly referred to. So, for example, in the Royal London Insurance case, the condition was explicitly intended to ensure that the development would not detract from the vitality and viability of the named town centre.

By contrast, I suggest that a vaguely worded reason (for example, “to enable the local planning authority to retain control over such uses in future” or some similar rubric) is unlikely to cut the mustard, especially bearing in mind that the procedural advice from ministers (as set out in the NPPG) continues to be firmly against conditions that purport to preclude the operation of section 55(2)(f) and Article 3(1) of the UCO or Article 3 and the Second Schedule to the GPDO. The very fact that there were until very recently model conditions (in Circular 11/95) that recommended explicit wording for such conditions is another persuasive factor which indicates that the general rule in Dunoon Developments should be applied in the absence of a very clear intention (backed up by a clearly stated and specific planning reason for the imposition of the condition) to preclude the operation of the statutory provisions.

[UPDATE: I noticed after writing this piece that "Annex A" to Circular 11/95 (model conditions) was not cancelled along with the rest of the circular. This was presumably meant to refer to APPENDIX A, where the model conditions quoted above (48 and 50 respectively) are to be found. This further strengthens the point that I sought to make.]

NOTE: This topic is more fully discussed in the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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The 56 day Rule Some further thoughts

12.34 in 56, Boat Plans, day, further, rule, some, the, thoughts

NOTE: For completely up-to-date and fully comprehensive coverage of this subject, we would strongly recommend readers to obtain a copy of the author’s new book - “A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO PERMITTED CHANGES OF USE” published by Bath Publishing in October 2015. You can order your copy by clicking on the link on the left-hand sidebar of this page.

Since I wrote my previous posts on this topic on 9 and 13 February and 11 March, I have taken the opportunity to look in more detail at the requirement as to the timing of the LPA’s notification of their determination of a prior approval application.

On the basis of the practical examples that I quoted in those posts, the consensus would appear to be that notification of the LPA’s determination of the prior application must not only be given by the authority within the 56-day period, but must also be received by the applicant within that period, and a proper construction of paragraph W(11), read as a whole, would seem to support this.

In paragraph W(11) of Part 3, sub-paragraph (a) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice of their determination that such prior approval is not required” and sub-paragraph (b) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice giving their prior approval”, although sub-paragraph (c) merely refers to “the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application was received by the local planning authority without the authority notifying the applicant as to whether prior approval is given or refused”.

Sub-paragraph (c) relates to both of these two alternative notifications under sub-paragraph (a) or (b), and (by implication) to the third possibility that the notice served by the authority may be to inform the applicant that prior approval is refused. It therefore seems clear from the context that sub-paragraph (c) must also be taken to refer to the receipt by the applicant of such a notice, so sub-paragraph (c) should in practice be read as - “the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application was received by the local planning authority without the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice as to whether prior approval is given or refused”.

Whilst on this topic, I am grateful to a correspondent for drawing to my attention the position regarding an appeal under section 78 against non-determination of a prior approval application, where the failure of the LPA to determine the application or to notify the applicant of that determination within the 56-day period is the sole determining factor in the appeal.

In such a case, the Planning Inspectorate seems recently to have taken the view that no appeal is required (or can be made) in such a case. I have been shown a letter from the Planning Inspectorate, written in May of this year in response to an appeal which had been made against non-determination of a prior approval application in Gloucestershire, in which they stated that, because it would appear that the LPA did not determine the application within the required 56 day period, the applicant can proceed with the development in these circumstances, and no right of appeal applies. The LPA had the power to refuse the application on the basis that the development was not appropriate for the prior approval process but there was no indication in this case that they did so. In the circumstances, the Inspectorate stated that the appeal appeared to be invalid and no further action would be taken on it. A copy of this letter was sent to the LPA who were asked to note its contents.

This would appear to dispose of the need to appeal against non-determination. If the applicant is correct in their assertion that they have the right to carry out the permitted development, then the expiry of the 56-day period would in principle enable the development to proceed, but if there is any doubt in such a case as to the qualification of the pre-existing use under the terms of the relevant Class of permitted development in Part 3, or as to the nature and scope of the proposed development itself, or if there is a dispute with the LPA as to the qualification of the site for change of use under the relevant Class in Part 3 (or where the LPA is otherwise challenging the right to carry out the proposed development), caution may suggest that the correctness of the applicant’s assertion as to the lawfulness of the proposed development should be tested by means of an application under section 192, before going ahead with the development.

It may be helpful to readers who are making an LDC application to be reminded of the judgment in F W Gabbitas v SSE and Newham LBC [1985] JPL 630, where it was held that the applicants own evidence does not need to be corroborated by "independent" evidence in order to be accepted. If the local planning authority has no evidence of its own, or from others, to contradict or otherwise make the applicants version of events less than probable, there is no good reason to refuse the application, provided the applicants evidence alone is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to justify the grant of a certificate "on the balance of probability”. This was helpfully summarised in paragraph 8.15 of Annex 8 to Circular 10/97. The Circular was cancelled in March 2014, but the legal principles that it set out continue to apply.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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We’re all going to be film stars!

08.39 in –, all, be, Boat Plans, examples, film, going, interesting, office, residential, some, stars, to, we’re

Not to be outdone by the forthcoming second series of ‘The Planners’ on the telly (which, by the way, is going to be re-titled “Not in My Back Yard!”), Uncle Eric has decided that the cameras should be allowed into planning committee meetings and planning hearings and inquiries.

New guidance is to be issued by De-CLoG, which "will make clear the rights for members of the press and public, including local bloggers and hyper-local [?] journalists, to report, film and tweet planning appeal hearings." In a press release, De-CLoG ministers express the hope that “this will open up a previously mysterious and rarely seen side of the planning process”.

The new freedom to record and film proceedings, including the use of digital and social media can be exercised in future in appeal hearings and inquiries, provided that it does not disrupt proceedings. According to the blurb, "Inspectors will advise people present at the start of the event that the proceedings may be recorded and/or filmed, and that anyone using social media during or after the end of the proceedings should do so responsibly."

Pickles is particularly annoyed, because previous guidance he published in June, which was intended to open up planning committee meetings in the same way, has been deliberately ignored by some councils. Unfortunately, he omitted to write this into recent changes to subordinate legislation on the conduct of council meetings, and so he can do no more for the time being other than to huff and puff about it (something Uncle Eric is rather good at doing).

The press release ‘names and shames’ several of the offending councils:

• Wirral Council banned a blogger from filming its planning committee on health and safety grounds, asserting the ban was necessary as they cannot ‘police’ people filming.

• Tower Hamlets stopped a 71 year old resident and OAP campaigner filming a council meeting in June 2013. Council officers asserted that allowing filming could lead to “reputational damage to the authority”

• Keighley Town Council stopped a council meeting when a group of pensioners started to film the meeting and called in the police who escorted the 11 residents from the town hall. Officials argued allowing filming would be a “breach of Standing Orders”

• Blogger Richard Taylor, producing a guide for citizens on how to film meetings, has warned that some councils have demanded identity papers, such as a passport, before allowing filming, and warned “be prepared for the police to be called and the possibility of arrest, especially if you intend to film, photograph, tweet or take notes on a laptop” (Apparently, he was threatened with arrest when he tried to film Huntingdon District Council.)

• Bexley Council has asserted it intends to continue to prohibit audio and visual filming due to its “agreed protocol”

• Stamford Town Council meeting has reaffirmed its ban on a newspaper reporter tweeting from a council meeting, due to “concerns about 140 character snippets of information not accurately portraying a debate”

I have no more sympathy than Pickles with these weak excuses. If meetings are open to the public (as most planning committee meetings must be by law), there can be no reasonable objection to the proceedings being filmed, photographed and recorded, or reported ‘live’ on social media.

On the other hand, if you have attended as many different planning committee meetings as I have, you may well understand the reluctance of elected members to have their ‘deliberations’ broadcast to the great unwashed. The sad fact is that the standard of debate in many planning committees is absolutely dire, and the poor calibre of elected members, their profound ignorance of planning principles and procedures, and general lack of common sense is appallingly obvious. When officers in one authority claimed that allowing filming could lead to “reputational damage to the authority”, their fears may well have been justified!

As for opening up planning inquiries and hearings to the cameras, camera phones and recorders, I rather suspect that interest in recording the proceedings in this way will rapidly wane. It is rare even to see a local print journalist at an appeal hearing or inquiry, and those members of the public who bother to attend mostly drift away by lunchtime on the first day. The plain fact is that for those not directly involved in the process, it is arcane and incomprehensible, and opening it up to the cameras is not going to change that.

Major public inquiries into controversial development proposals might attract the TV cameras, but they will have the same problem as print journalists who have tried to cover these proceedings in the past. The bigger the development scheme, the longer the inquiry, and for journalists and TV crews it is likely to prove as exciting as watching paint dry.

Still, it makes a good silly season story, and Uncle Eric can feel satisfied that he has taken yet another decisive step to improve the planning system. Never mind, that we are still not building more than a tiny proportion of the new homes that are so urgently needed. Never mind that local planning authorities are starved of funds and can hardly cope with their work as a result. And never mind that all Uncle Eric’s previous brave words and stirring deeds have done virtually nothing to make any really significant change to the planning system.
______________

UPDATE (30 August 2013): I am told that Merton Council has begun webcasting various meetings within the past few months, including its Planning Applications Committee (although I am told that after two meetings no further webcasts have been made due to "technical difficulties"). A correspondent has suggested that readers should watch the first three applications presented on 18 April.

The webcasts can be accessed on:

http://www.merton.public-i.tv/core/portal/webcasts

This is not a link, but if you copy and paste this URL into the address line on your browser, the page should open. Don’t panic when you get no sound at the beginning. The camera was switched on before the meeting began, and the sound only starts when the Chairman opens the meeting, 7½ minutes into the recording. (You can move the cursor along to get to this point without having to watch usual the pre-meeting comings and goings in total silence. Alternatively, the menu on the right of the page enables you to go straight to the start of each item. The first application is reached about 10¾ minutes ibnto the recording.)

The 18 April meeting seems fairly typical to me. One thing you’ll notice is that the proceedings might reasonably be described as ‘unhurried’. It takes over 20 minutes, including the planning officer’s introduction, and public statements, before the members of the committee start to discuss the first application around 33½ minutes into the recording.

Anyway, see what you make of it.


© MARTIN H GOODALL

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